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Abstract—As the public Ethereum network surpasses half a
billion transactions and enterprise Blockchain systems becoming
highly capable of meeting the demands of global deployments,
production Blockchain applications are fast becoming common-
place across a diverse range of business and scientific verticals. In
this paper, we reflect on work we have been conducting recently
surrounding the ingestion, retrieval and analysis of Blockchain
data. We describe the scaling and semantic challenges when
extracting Blockchain data in a way that preserves the original
metadata of each transaction by cross referencing the Smart
Contract interface with the on-chain data. We then discuss a
scientific use case in the area of Scientific workflows by describing
how we can harvest data from tasks and dependencies in a generic
way. We then discuss how crawled public blockchain data can be
analyzed using two unsupervised machine learning algorithms,
which are designed to identify outlier accounts or smart contracts
in the system. We compare and contrast the two machine learning
methods and cross correlate with public Websites to illustrate the
effectiveness such approaches.
Index Terms—blockchain, analytics, scientific workflows,
anomaly detection, ethereum
I. INTRODUCTION
At the time of writing, the public Ethereum network has
been running for around 1450 days since July 2015, and ac-
cording to [1] it has processed almost 506 million transactions
to date. The average number of daily transactions is 350,000
since its inception, and recently in June 2019, [2] noted that
the number of transactions exceeded 1 million again for the
first time since the cryptocurrency boom ended in May 2018.
For enterprise deployments, companies tend to deploy their
private Blockchain ledgers and organizations, such as Enter-
prise Ethereum Alliance [3], have 250 member companies that
are actively pursuing private Blockchain deployments. Other
enterprise open source Blockchain platforms that are based on
Ethereum, such as Quorum, are specifically designed for En-
terprise use, combining the innovation of the public Ethereum
community with enhancements to support enterprise needs.
Quorum’s vision is to enable solutions that allow companies
to securely share their Blockchain business processes and
data with other partners and consequently include node based
authorization to define which companies have access to what.
To this end, Quorum has partnered with Microsoft to provide
Quorum as an elastic Azure Blockchain Service [4] earlier this
year. Such elastic private deployments are leading to multiple
innovative business applications, which, in turn, will lead to a
plethora of Blockchain data that contains a valuable transaction
history of business, where insights can be drawn, and fed into
new business models that can continue to drive innovation.
Similarly, in research, there is a broad range of interest in
Blockchains, from the low level mechanisms including novel
consensus algorithms, to applied research in a multitude of
domains where Blockchain has become a research topic in
understanding the qualitative and quantitative benefits that
impact such sectors.
In this paper, we describe three studies we’ve been conduct-
ing recently surrounding the ingestion, retrieval and analysis
of Blockchain data. The research began with an investigation
into how one might extract data that has been recorded
on an Ethereum Blockchain, in order to better understand
Ethereum transactions, the encoding used and how the original
metadata of transactions might be retrieved in full. The state
of Ethereum Blockchain changes continually through activities
such as transactions, contracts, and mining. Ethereum data
structure is very complex, and it uses the trie data structure
to manage the relationship between confirmed transactions
balances and smart contracts’ data. We discuss this in detail
in Section III.
The second use case we consider is the ingesting of data
into the Blockchain in the context of executable science ex-
periments, using computational workflows. Workflows provide
a structured methodology for describing complex functional
execution, data, and logic pipelines. They enable the repro-
ducibility of experiments and results by exposing underlying
scientific processes in a detailed and reproducible fashion.
Scientific and business processes can be modeled as a set
of self-contained tasks, which can be independently devel-
oped, validated, refined and composed for different configura-
tions [5] and by specifying the control of data dependencies
and logic for execution, workflows are capable of modeling
the entire scientific process. Workflow uptake has increased
over the past several years and systems have become very
sophisticated and are designed to address a wide range of
distributed computing and data dependency needs within a vast
multitude of application domains.
Workflows are a good use case for Blockchain ingestion
because they are generic platforms that support multiple
scientific research studies. Once integrated, insights can be
recorded on the Blockchain, then later crawled and analyzed,
to verify and validate the processes and cyberinfrastructure
used to conduct such research. To this end, we integrated
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a Blockchain tracking component into the Pegasus workflow
system [6]. Pegasus is a DAG-based workflow system that
interacts with multiple data management and computational
infrastructures and has been used in multiple contexts, in-
cluding the recent LIGO gravitational wave discovery. This
is described in Section IV.
The third use case we consider is for the analysis of
Blockchain data. In this use case, we used machine learning
to extract potentially suspicious accounts from the public
Ethereum Blockchain. To this end, we used two machine
learning algorithms to attempt to discern between normal and
nefarious Ethereum accounts by learning to detect outliers
by using clustering on their transactional history. In this
study, we used support vector machines (SVM) and K-means
clustering to detect such outliers, which may be scam accounts
or suspicious, for some other reason. Our results, presented
in Section V, indicate a correlation between the outliers we
extract and those accounts flagged as suspicious by Etherscan.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents an overview of similar works; our investigations are
described in Sections III, IV, and V; finally, we present our
conclusions in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Extracting information from the blockchain is not a new
idea: efforts started as soon as people realized the difficulties
imposed by the nature of the blockchain’s structure. Several
of those early tools are not available anymore. Perhaps one
of the first endeavors was a library of forensic tools for the
Bitcoin network called BitIodine [7]. The tools were capable of
parsing the blockchain to collect and visualize relevant infor-
mation, having also the ability to perform address clustering,
classification and labeling. After extracting information from
the blockchain, it is stored in a relational database. The authors
analyzed known cases involved with the black market web site
Silk Road and victims of the CryptoLocker ransomware, where
they identified specific connections between the Silk Road and
its founder, using only information publicly available on the
blockchain.
Trying to expand and generalize on the idea of extract-
ing useful information from the blockchain, [8] presented
BlockSci, a platform for blockchain analysis that supports sev-
eral different blockchains. They use an in-memory database,
and claim speedups from 15 to 600x in relation to other
approaches. However, it does not provide support to Smart
Contract platforms like Ethereum. In a subsequent similar
effort, [9] proposed a framework to support data analytics on
Bitcoin and Ethereum, reorganizing blockchain data in SQL or
NoSQL databases. They try to address the need for combining
blockchain data with external information such as user, market
and crime-related data.
Correspondingly to other efforts focused on the Bitcoin
network, [10] proposed Ethereum Query Language (EQL),
to query the Ethereum blockchain directly using a SQL-
like language. The authors pose the problem mentioning
the difficulty of access to the blockchain data through any
other means than sequential access or indexed hash. They
implement indexing through Binary Search Trees, however,
this brings high storage requirements. Despite being conceived
for the Ethereum network, the authors acknowledge EQL has
limitations to deal with contracts.
In a work that falls in a slightly different category, Block-
bench [11] presents a framework for comparison between
private blockchains in terms of data processing capabilities.
However it does not approach data extraction directly, it
highlights the limitations of blockchains as a direct source
for data analytics. One of the main conclusions is that these
blockchains are not well suited for large scale data processing.
Several works propose the ingestion of blockchain trans-
actions to a graph-based database, as a means to facilitate
data analytics. In one of them, [12] built a graph of all
transactions and addresses in the Bitcoin network up until May
2013. They tried to gain an understanding of user profiles
and their balances, how they keep, move or exchange their
Bitcoin assets. They found that while an enormous number
of transactions exchange only fractional amounts, hundreds of
transactions transferred more than 50,000 Bitcoin.
Also using a graph constructed from the blockchain trans-
actions, [13] studied the anonymity in the Bitcoin network.
Among other noticeable activities, applying the PageRank
algorithm classified an account that is associated to the FBI
(and to which funds seized from the famous Silk Road were
transferred) as highly important. Similarly, [14] were able
to track assets illegally obtained from the Gatecoin hack
being redirected to accounts associated with known cryptocur-
rency exchanges, and suggests that a graph interpretation of
blockchain data may be the more appropriate for this type of
application.
In another approach, [15] proposed BlockChainVis, a tool
for visual analysis of Bitcoin transaction flows to identify
illegal activity, ingesting the entire Bitcoin transaction history
into its database. A flagged set of nearly 16,000 transactions
turned out to correspond to exchange of values between only
two addresses, however these could not be confirmed to be
related to illegal activity. Also trying to visually identify
anomalous patterns in the transactions, as well as empirically
verify economic indicators through metrics like inflation and
velocity of circulation, [16] ingested roughly 8 years of Bitcoin
transaction data into a graph database, using a cluster of 400
cores. The authors estimate a total size of the resulting graph
at about 600GB.
Looking for local patterns that can be correlated to im-
portant events, like asset price fluctuations, [17] extend the
concept of network motifs and graphlets to blockchain graphs,
to what they call chainlets. The authors tested the statistical
Granger causality between changes in chainlets and their effect
on Bitcoin price, concluding that certain types of chainlets can
be used to predict Bitcoin prices.
In a noticeable trend also among the works that focus
on extracting or manipulating data from the blockchain, a
number of works set their aim specifically in fraud detection.
[18] investigate the influence of anonymization services in
the Bitcoin network, as many of them can be used in money
laundering activities. Their results demonstrate these services
add an effective layer of difficulty for most crime investigators.
On a different direction inside this area, [19] tried to identify
financial frauds known as Ponzi schemes in Bitcoin. The
authors created a set of features extracted from transactions
and fed them into Random Forest and XGBoost to obtain
a classification result that indicates potential fraud activity.
Using this approach, they report a true positive rate of about
83% with a false positive rate below 4.4%.
Focusing on the Ethereum network, [9] present a method-
ology to identify and collect information on Smart Contracts
that implement Ponzi schemes and investigate their properties.
The authors were able to identify an alarming number of
Smart Contracts involved in this type of fraud, but fortunately
their impact was still small. More recently, [20] turned to the
Bitcoin network to detect activities related to such schemes.
The authors manually collected a dataset composed by the
transaction graphs associated to Ponzi-related addresses, along
with a sample of graphs unrelated to such activities. They used
supervised machine learning algorithms to perform detection
of Ponzi-related activity. The best model was a Random Forest
classifier, with an accuracy of nearly 99%, however, it is not
clear if they made use of cross-validation to prevent overfitting
the training set.
Despite the growing number of works in this area and
the massive volume of data available in current blockchains,
there is a lack of proper machine learning datasets constructed
with well defined objectives and shared among the research
community. Most of the works create their own dataset out of
a subset of the blockchain. In each of them, the authors simply
seem to use criteria they deem appropriate. Another point that
gives rise to further investigation is the fact that most of past
works either: a) focus on the Bitcoin network, which does
not offer built-in support for Smart Contracts; or b) put aside
Ethereum’s comprehensive Smart Contract mechanism as a
source for data to be extracted and analyzed.
III. LESSONS LEARNED IN CRAWLING BLOCKCHAIN DATA
As the name suggests, blockchain is a sequential data
structure by nature. A blockchain like Ethereum consists of
collections of transactions, packed into blocks, linked together
sequentially and in an immutable manner. The integrity of
data is ensured by the use of cryptographic hash functions:
any change in the input data will cause the hash function to
generate a different value, indicating the data was modified.
This ensures the immutability of the sequence of blocks, along
with all their contents.
Additionally, the use of Merkle tree [21] structures can
allow extremely fast integrity verification of the entire
blockchain. A Merkle tree is a hierarchical structure where
every element is linked to its children by their hashes, down
to the leaves, which correspond to the hashes of each block
(or transaction). This allows peers in the network to detect
tampering in the data almost instantaneously: it is possible to
verify if two copies of the entire blockchain are identical just
by comparing the root hash of their Merkle trees, regardless
of the size of the tree.
These characteristics that the blockchain a data storage
that is at the same time immutable and distributed because
its verification mechanisms eliminate the need for peers to
trust each other. However, this architecture also shapes the
blockchain as a sequential structure and limit its flexibility.
The Ethereum node API, for instance, only allows retrieval of
blocks by their sequential number or by their hash. Suppose
a block that was written in a specific date has to be retrieved:
unless the block hash is known beforehand, the only alternative
is to search blocks sequentially (using their number), and
verifying their dates, until the desired date is found.
Search is not the only operation that is hindered by the
blockchain structure. Aggregation and join queries are trivial
in traditional database management systems but are prohibitive
in the blockchain because of the complexity of their implemen-
tation and computational cost. This is the reason why virtually
all of the previous works in this area perform some type of
data extraction and transformation as a preprocessing step for
the analysis.
A. Smart contract information
Smart Contracts are, in a simple way, distributed programs
that are stored in the blockchain and essentially provide a
data interface to what is stored and enable further logic to be
embedded. The data interface in Ethereum uses functions to
define a data transaction payload, along with typed parameters
that define what is written and in what format. All the network
nodes have access to the same executable code, and Ethereum
architecture ensures that the result of that program will be
the same for any node that executes it. If the results differ,
consensus between the nodes cannot be reached, and one of
them will have to be discarded. This also means that anyone
can verify the output of a Smart Contract, by executing it with
the same inputs.
Ethereum implements Smart Contracts through its execution
model, known as Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). In the
EVM, Smart Contracts are a special type of account, and they
have access to two types of persistent memory storage. The
first type is the account storage, a virtually infinite storage
that is granted to each account. However, storing data in the
account storage is very expensive. The second type is through
event logs: during execution, contracts can trigger events that
record data in a log. Also, the invoking transaction stores the
data that is passed as arguments to the invoked contract.
Extracting information stored in a contract’s account storage
is possible, but not trivial, especially for non-basic data types.
The structure of the storage is defined in the source code of the
smart contract, which is not always available. The information
that is passed in contract invocations is also encoded, and to
have access to it, it is required to have either the contract
Application Binary Interface (ABI) or the source code itself.
Most blockchain tools are limited to extracting and storing
binary transaction information unmodified, but in the case of
interaction with smart contracts, this also limits the ability
to gain understanding of the data semantics. The binary pay-
load of these transactions contains encoded information about
which contract methods are invoked, and the arguments that
are passed in these calls. Therefore, it is eminently important
for a data extraction tool to be able to semantically reconstruct
the information from these interactions whenever the source
code or the ABI of the contract is available.
B. Data ingestion
Following the trend described in Section II, and with the
intention to create a more flexible data organization, we
have developed a blockchain extraction tool for the Ethereum
network that is capable of crawling the blocks and ingesting
its contents into a relational database. However, the scale of
a public blockchain like Ethereum is a problem by itself:
Currently, the Ethereum network encompasses more than
70 million distinct addresses [22], more than 500 million
transactions in over 8 million blocks [1], and a strong growth
tendency. We set up a fully synchronized local Ethereum
node, and to improve efficiency, we built our tool to run
multiple threads, potentially multiplying the ingestion rate
by the number of simultaneous threads. On the other hand,
running a multi-threaded crawler creates additional strain on
the Ethereum node and the database server, to the point where
I/O started to become a bottleneck.
Efficiently storing and manipulating the entire public
Ethereum history in consumer-grade computers is quickly
becoming harder. Last year Google announced the public
availability of the entire Ethereum history (along with other
blockchains) on their cloud computing platform [23]. This
image is incrementally updated daily. Their platform allows
querying the blockchain data on their BigData infrastructure
using traditional SQL language. Querying Ethereum data from
Google BigQuery platform is highly convenient from the data
analytics standpoint: complex queries are processed with great
performance in a distributed environment, while the costs
are fairly low, following the “pay-as-you-go” business model.
There are however some situations where BigQuery public
dataset might not be adequate, including such examples as 1)
private blockchains, and 2) exploration/interaction with Smart
Contracts. In the first case, it is necessary to extract and
transform the blockchain data to be able to perform analysis on
it, for the reasons discussed in the beginning of this Section.
IV. DATA INGESTION IN SCIENCE: PROVIDING AUDIT
TRAILS FOR SCIENTIFIC WORKFLOWS
Workflows provide a generic means of specifying a set
of jobs, along with control or data dependencies, which can
be distributed across a large number of distributed resources.
Providing the capability of recording a non repudiable trail
of workflows therefore, can give a number of insights into
the performance of specific workflows on different cyber-
infrastructures and can provide a useful tool for researchers
and consortium to track scientific experiments that have been
run, along with the datasets that have been used in each case.
For example, the makespan of multiple workflow instances
can be analyzed to better understand empirically which dis-
tributed architecture suits that computational pipeline better.
Alternatively, one might use such information for validation
and verification of the data: recording the hashcodes of the data
used in each workflow, and verify the correct datasets were
used for a set of experiments. Further, if a dataset contained
an anomaly, one could search and retrieve all workflows that
processed that dataset in order to quickly understand which
experiments need to be re-run to rectify the results.
To this end and to demonstrate the feasibility of using
Ethereum blockchain to store workflow execution events, we
have developed a proof of concept tracking system, using
an open-source and well known workflow management sys-
tem, Pegasus1. We created an add-on for Pegasus that was
configured to run inside a container, along with a local
HTCondor2 pool as the execution environment. Test workflows
that are bundled with the software were thenrun through
Pegasus, while monitoring the transactions being written to the
blockchain. The objective was to verify that every stage of the
workflow processing is properly logged onto the blockchain.
A. Implementation
We have modified Pegasus, adding to its logging subsystem
the ability to write flow execution events into a private
Ethereum network. Using a middleware called Aladdin, we
enabled Pegasus to send log events to a Smart Contract written
with the intent of keeping a record of such events. Aladdin
is an Application Programming Interface (API) developed by
the Center for Research Computing to provide interaction with
Smart Contracts on the Ethereum network over HTTP.
Workow execution
Aladdin API
Ethereum
Fig. 1. Using Aladdin API to log Pegasus workflow execution events to
Ethereum blockchain.
When a workflow is submitted to Pegasus, it is decomposed
in smaller tasks that are organized in a graph, so that their
dependencies can be tracked and these tasks can be distributed
across the execution environment. One of such sub-tasks is
the staging of data into the computation nodes for execution
(the second block in the workflow execution graph in Fig. 1).
Before transferring input files to the execution node, Pegasus
generates a SHA-256 hash on each of them, to verify if the
copy succeeded without errors. We added an extra step to this
process, which is to register the file transfer along with the
1https://github.com/pegasus-isi/pegasus
2https://research.cs.wisc.edu/htcondor/
hashcodes into Ethereum, making that information instantly
shared and non-repudiable. This way, other researchers can
verify their hashcodes and easily detect errors in the data.
Like in the data staging, other execution tasks are also
logged to the blockchain. The consolidation of logs has the
potential to facilitate future analyses on the execution of
workflows, for instance: find the more efficient execution
environment or computing node, compare execution times,
or detect possible anomalies in the execution environment.
Information from the Pegasus log subsystem is encoded in
JSON format and written to the blockchain once every sub-
task is concluded. We have published the formatted results of
the blockchain logging at https://bit.ly/2Mx3zO3, where job
details can be verified along with the information about the
transaction in which they were recorded.
V. IDENTIFYING ANOMALIES IN BLOCKCHAIN
TRANSACTIONAL BEHAVIOR USING MACHINE LEARNING
Initial coin offering (ICOs) and Security Token Offering
(STOs) are recently changing the landscape of funding small
businesses and startup ideas across the marketplace. Both
STOs and ICOs are built utilizing Smart Contracts (SC), which
run on the blockchain and automatically execute when certain
requirements are met. This differentiates such applications
from traditional businesses because SCs identifiers can be
tracked to expose their transactions. Consequently, such an
approach can provide a clear picture of transactions surround-
ing a particular business and how and with whom it operates.
Regulatory entities, such as the SEC, can take advantage of
data analytics to better monitor ICOs and STOs, as they
begin their operations. Such transparency and introspection
will not only facilitate easier regulation and monitoring of such
companies, but it will also lead to more trusted investment
opportunities for individuals as this space progresses.
Given such needs that arise from this modern scenario of
growing adoption of blockchain technologies, we pose the
question whether it is possible to automate the identification of
suspicious activity in blockchains. To this end, we propose the
use of clustering techniques and SVMs to identifying outliers
through the automated identification of discriminating features,
that differentiate the outliers from the more conventional
transactions between Ethereum accounts and smart contracts.
A. Experiments
We define an outlying account as an account whose transac-
tion activity is somehow different than the vast majority of the
rest of the accounts. The largest group of accounts with similar
transaction activity are considered to have normal transaction
profiles.
Our approach compares different unsupervised machine
learning algorithms to cluster averaged account transactions
across a timeline into two categories: outliers and normal
accounts. Using the results from the machine learning al-
gorithms we then search the outliers using public websites
that identify rogue accounts, Etherscan 3 and CryptoScamDB4
3https://etherscan.io/
4https://cryptoscamdb.org/
TABLE I
RESULTS OF UNSUPERVISED AND SUPERVISED CLUSTERING USING A TEST
PARTITION OF THE DATA
Grouping Results
K-Means
G1 G2 G3 G4
SVM
G1 5588166 3 0 9
G2 0 16 0 0
G3 1 0 4 2
G4 10 0 0 79
(formerly EtherscamDB). We found that the approach did in
fact discover rogue accounts, consistent to public comments
on those accounts.
Using publicly available transactions, account features were
constructed aggregating transaction information and the age of
each account. These account features were put into a dataset
containing about 7 million accounts. These were then used to
train machine learning algorithms for outlier detection. The
first machine learning algorithm used for this was an SVM
for novelty detection.
A One Class SVM, or OCSVM [24], is an unsupervised
machine learning algorithm that detects anomalies by learning
a spatial boundary in which most of the samples are contained.
If the sample is located outside of those boundaries, it is
considered a novelty. Training the OCSVM on the account
features produced accounts that were flagged as outliers. A
number of these outliers had comments in Etherscan suggest-
ing that they are scam accounts.
As a way of seconding the results of the OCSVM, another
machine learning algorithm was used on the same data, K-
Means clustering. K-Means clustering is another unsupervised
algorithm that partitions the observations into a predefined (k)
number of clusters, and each observation is clustered with
the nearest cluster mean. K-Means yielded a lower number of
accounts considered to be outliers compared to the OCSVM,
but 85% of the outlying accounts produced from the K-
Means were also flagged as outliers by the OCSVM. Public
comments from Etherscan affirm that the suspected accounts
are scams. With the data from the K-Means, another machine
supervised learning algorithm could be implemented to check
the consistency of both the OCSVM and K-Means.
In another experiment, the labeled clusters from the K-
Means are then used as training labels for an SVM, used to
classify the data. Similar to OCSVM, an SVM is a supervised
machine learning algorithm that tries to find optimal separation
margins in the data it is given, to separate it into classes. When
the remaining test subset of the data is run through the SVM,
the predicted classes match the groupings created by the K-
Means by about 86% as seen in the confusion matrix presented
in Table I.
However different in their workings, all three algorithms
had overlap with each other. These overlaps are the accounts
flagged as outliers. The OCSVM flagged the highest amount of
accounts as outliers. The K-Means used four centers to group
the ethereum account data (Seen as Xs in Fig. 2), and OCSVM
agreed regarding these outliers. The SVM classified the data
based on the results from the K-Means where it yielded results
similar to the K-Means.
Fig. 2. K-Means Cluster results of Ethereum account data. The black Xs
denote cluster centers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we described three areas of work surrounding
the the ingestion, retrieval and analysis of Blockchain data. We
described a system we developed that is capable of crawling
the blockchain in order to extract data and to cross correlate the
Smart Contract interfaces with the code in order to reconstruct
the metadata correctly. We discussed lessons learned from this
work for public blockchains where scalability becomes quite
challenging, but maintaining that such a solution could be used
to retrieve data from private blockchains, using the elasticity of
the cloud to meet such demands. We then described an imple-
mentation for collecting data about the execution and data used
in scientific workflows, by augmenting the Pegasus workflow
systems and harvesting data from tasks and dependencies in a
generic way. Finally, we discussed how we applied a number
of machine learning techniques to identify abnormal activity
in public Ethereum accounts. Currently, we can process the
entire Ethereum dataset, and we showed how we successfully
identified outlier accounts that warrant further investigation.
We are also collecting and organizing external information
that will allow us to perform more reliable evaluation of these
methods.
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